Franklin Pierce Gabbard was the seventh child and second son of nine known children born to Michael Gabbard, Jr. and his wife, Elizabeth Cundiff.

Known as F.P. to some and as Pierce to his family, he married Fannie Vires (White or Wyatt) about 1899. He lived his entire life in Breathitt County and was a casualty of one of the many "Bloody Breathitt" feuds.

Newpapers reported his death this way:

Decatur Daily Review, Decatur, Illinois, Sunday 21 Dec 1930, pg 1, col 2:
Kentucky Feud Is Revived, 2 Dead 2 Others Wounded Jackson, Ky, Dec 20 (AP) -- "Bloody Breathitt" county's guns blazed again today, resulting in the death of two men and the wounding of an eighteen-year-old girl and another man. Ike Little, fifty-five, was found shot to death on a mountain side this afternoon, and Wilton Gabbard, twenty-nine, died tonight as a result of knife wounds and a beating. Little's daughter, Virgie, was wounded at the same time her father was killed. Gabbard's father, Pierce Gabbard, was found wounded shortly after his son was found critically hurt near the scene of the shooting. The trouble arose while members of the two families were participating in a turkey shot near their homes six miles from here. Breathitt county deputies tonight were seeking little's [sic] sons, Fred, George and Herman Little, who they say apparenlty attacked the Gabbards after their father and daughter were shot.

Charleston Daily Mail, Charleston, WVa, Monday 22 Dec 1930, pg 7, col 8:
Third Victim Dead
Jackson, Ky, Dec 22 (AP) -- The death of Pierce Gabbard, 57 years old, yesterday was the third fatality from a stabbing a shooting affray Saturday growing out of a Breathitt county feud. His son, Wilton Gabbard, 29 years old, died Saturday night of knife wounds, and Isaac Little, 55 years old, was shot to death.

A grandson (Gene Wickline) remembers it told this way:
It was around Christmas-time, 1930, and Pierce Gabbard's son, Wilton, entered a turkey shoot near Oakdale Christian Academy in KY. Wilton won a rifle as a prize for his expert marksmanship. On his walk home through a hollow, he came overtop a hill where he saw "Old Man Gabbard" being beaten, stoned and robbed by three Turner men. Wilton tried to step in and break up the fight when he was overtaken by the Turner men, beaten and stabbed to death.
The Turner men realizing that Wilton's father, Pierce, would come after them after he hears of his son's death, they decided to kill him before he could kill them. They went home to get their guns and ran into a friend and the four of them set out with murder on their minds.
Pierce's wife, Fannie, asked him to go up the road to her brother Bob's house for some eggs. It is said that this was the only time anyone could remember that Pierce did not have his gun with him. He was almost back home when he was ambushed by the Turner gang. He was able to make it through his gate when he died of his gunshot wounds.

Owsley County Historical Society; Breathitt County Death Certificates; Contributed by Joel Myers and Jill Frese; Transcribed by Connie Rosenbalm:

GABBARD, Pierce
December 21, 1930 Breathitt County, Terry No. 6
DOB Blank
POB Kentucky
Labor
Age: 58
Married
Cause of Death: Homicidal Gun shot of abdomen; Hemorrhage
Place of death: Home
Father: Mike Gabbard Kentucky
Mother: Lizzie Cundiff Kentucky
Informant: Blank
Burial: Gabbard Flat December 22, 1930
Certificate: 292

In 1913, Pierce was sent to prison for life for the murder of Ike Gabbard, his double first cousin. It is unknown by this researcher where he was incarcerated or when he was released, though it was most certainly before December of 1930 when he was killed.

The Southwestern Reporter
With Key Number Annotations
Volume 156
St Paul
West Publishing Co.
1913
Pages 1037 -1038

Gabbard V. Commonwealth

(Court of Appeals of Kentucky. May 29, 1913)
1. HOMICIDE (§167*) – EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY.
In a prosecution for homicide, evidence of threats made by deceased against accused only a few hours previous to the killing is competent for the purpose of showing the state of mind of the one making them and determining who was the aggressor, even though the killing was deliberate and at the time thereof deceased was in no way menacing accused.
2. HOMICIDE (§339*) – APPEAL-HARMLESS ERROR.
In a prosecution for homicide, where accused, after having a difficulty with deceased, fled, and upon arming himself returned and shot deceased, who was standing in the doorway of his house, pursuing deceased and his wife into and through the house, the exclusion of evidence of threats made by deceased against accused only a few hours before the killing was not prejudicial; it being clear that the murder was willful and deliberate.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Breathitt County.
Pierce Gabbard was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.
Cope & Cope and A.H. Patton, all of Jackson, for appellant. James Garnett, Atty. Gen., and Overton S. Hogan, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.
Lassing, J. The grand jury of Breathitt county indicted Pierce Gabbard, charging him with the willful murder of Ike Gabbard. He was tried, found guilty, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for life. From the judgment of conviction he appeals and complains that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence and that the court erred in the admission of incompetent evidence, in the rejection of competent evidence, and in his instructions to the jury.
The deceased lived, and ran a country store, about eight miles from Jackson, the county seat of Breathitt county, and was a neighbor and double first cousin of the accused. On September 23, 1912, both the accused and deceased had been drinking and were, to some extent, under the influence of liquor. Pierce Gabbard, on that day, came to the store ostensibly to pay an account he owed decedent. While he was in front of the store and deceased was at his dwelling near by, words passed between them, and finally there was an exchange of some three or four shots, resulting, according to the testimony of the commonwealth, in the wounding of the appellant. Deceased was not injured in that difficulty. After this shooting, appellant disappeared, but returned within an hour bearing a double-barreled shotgun and a Winchester repeating rifle and, finding the deceased and his wife seated at the front door of their dwelling, opened fire upon them. Ike Gabbard and his wife were both struck by these shots, with fatal results in the case of the husband. They retreated into and through the house, and when Ike Gabbard had reached a point about 50 yards from his house he fell to the ground dead. Appellant undertakes to explain his return with the guns in this way: He was a constable and had arranged with some persons to aid him in the arrest of a deserter from the United States Army, and these guns were for those who were to assist him in this duty, and the road passing the residence of deceased was the only way he could proceed in the effort to arrest this deserter.
[1,2] The commonwealth made out a strong case of inexcusable homicide. While in the motion and grounds for a new trial it was urged that the verdict was not supported by the evidence, that point is not seriously pressed here, but counsel insist that the judgment should be reversed because the trial court erred in excluding competent evidence. This consisted of threats alleged to have been made by the deceased against appellant on the day of the homicide, and only a few hours previous thereto. It is held in commonwealth v. Thomas, 104 S. W. 326, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 899, and Wheeler v. Commonwealth, 120 Ky. 697, 87 S. W. 1106, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 1090, that evidence of this character is competent for the purpose of showing the state of mind of the one making them, and also for the purpose of determining who was the aggressor. In all cases, where it has reasonably appeared that the admission of such evidence would throw light upon either of these questions, where they were involved, it has been held error on the part of the trial court to exclude it. If the killing had occurred during the first encounter, it would have been error to exclude this evidence of previous threats made by the decease against appellant; but, according to the evidence offered by appellant, no injury resulted from the first encounter. From all the evidence, it is apparent that it only resulted in arousing appellant's anger, and if the evidence for the commonwealth is to be believed, he left the scene of the difficulty declaring that he was going after his gun and kill his cousin. He undoubtedly continued in this frame of mind, for on his road home he passed several persons to whom he related the story of the difficulty with his cousin, with more or less detail, and to each he declared, in substance, his purpose to carry out the threat make in the presence of deceased's wife when he left their home. He went as rapidly as he could to his own home, a mile or a mile and a quarter distant, got his gun, and started back toward the home of deceased. On his way he stopped at the house of a relative, who was not at home at the time, went in, got a Winchester rifle, and proceeded back to the scene of the first difficulty. It is in evidence that he was followed by two of his children and was requested by some friends, whom h passed, to return to his home and not have any difficulty. While he stoutly denies any purpose to have further trouble with the deceased, the conclusion is irresistible, from the overwhelming weight of the evidence, that appellant returned to the home of deceased for the purpose of avenging a wrong which he conceived deceased had don him, by shooting him or shooting at him in the first encounter. Appellant had declared his purpose to kill decease, and immediately he reached the latter's home, he opened fire upon him while he was standing in the door of his own home. His aim was true, and the effect of the shots deadly. Deceased and his wife retreated into their house and out of the rear portion thereof; the wife going in one direction, the deceased in another. Appellant followed them into the house, searched for them, and, when he failed to find them there, fired his gun two or three times while in the house.
We are unable to see, under the circumstances as developed by this evidence, what light evidence of previous threats could have shed upon the question of who was the aggressor, or the frame of mind in which the deceased was at the time the last difficulty commenced. Still, this evidence was competent; but, while competent, it was merely cumulative; and, when this is the case, no reversal should be ordered because of its exclusion, where it appears, from a consideration of the entire record, the accused had a fair trial. Hargis v. commonwealth, 135 Ky. 578, 123 s. W. 239. The evidence as to the first difficulty, which was given to the jury in detail, showed the frame of mind the deceased was in, and the conduct of each party left no room for doubt as to who was the aggressor in the difficulty, resulting in the killing for which appellant was tried. Under the circumstances, it was not prejudicial for the trial court to exclude this evidence of threats from consideration by the jury.
The evidence for the commonwealth was to the effect that appellant was shot in the arm during the first encounter, and that this angered him and aroused in him a murderous spirit, causing him then and there to declare his purpose to kill deceased. With this end in view, he went to his home, armed himself, and, despite the pleadings and protests of his relatives and friends, returned to the scene of the difficulty and carried his threat into execution. It was a cold-blooded, premeditated murder, and it is difficult to see how a jury at all mindful of their oaths, could have imposed a milder punishment. Few cases have come before us where the evidence so clearly established a murderous purpose, so deliberately planned and so boldly executed.
After a careful consideration of the record, we see no reason for disturbing the judgment. It is therefore affirmed.